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MEN AND
DECISIONS

first part of chap?
ref

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Secretary of War Stimson, to whom the report was addressed, conveyed it to the President and Prime Minister Churchill. Stimson's diary records that the President "was tremendously peped up by it." Harvey H. Bundy, who was present when Churchill heard it, has recorded that the elder statesman waved his cigar and said, "Stimson, what was gunpowder? Trivial. What was electricity? Meaningless. This atomic bomb is the Second Coming in Wrath."⁸

But weeks before the date of the Alamogordo test, the war in the Pacific was already in its final stages, and the Japanese Government knew that they faced defeat. The Japanese High Command had been aware of it for months. It was not a secret in Washington, either. Two weeks earlier than the Alamogordo test the Secretary of War had informed the President that the Japanese Navy "is nearly destroyed and she is vulnerable to surface and underwater blockade which can deprive her of sufficient food and supplies for her population. She is terribly vulnerable to our concentrated air attack upon her crowded cities, industrial and food resources." He was inclined to think that it would be well worth while to give the Japanese warning of what was to come and definite opportunity to capitulate.

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in his final report to Secretary Forrestal noted:

. . . when she [Japan] surrendered . . . her Navy had been destroyed and her Merchant Fleet had been fatally crippled. Dependent upon imported food and raw materials and relying upon sea transport to support her Armies at home and overseas, Japan lost the war because she lost command of the sea, and in doing so lost—to us—the island bases from which her factories and cities could be destroyed by air. . . . of twelve [Japanese] battleships, eleven were sunk; of twenty-six carriers, twenty were sunk; of forty-three cruisers, thirty-eight were destroyed; etc. throughout the various types of ships which collectively constituted a fleet considerably larger than ours was before the war. The few ships that remained afloat were for the most part so heavily damaged as to be of no military value.

. . . After Okinawa was in our hands, the Japanese were in a desperate situation, which could be alleviated only if they could strike a counter-blow either by damaging our fleet or by driving us from our advanced island position. The inability of the Japanese to do either was strong evidence of their increasing impotence and indicated that the end could not be long delayed.

Between July 10 and August 6, the forces under Admiral Halsey's command had destroyed or damaged 2804 enemy planes and sunk or damaged 148 Japanese combat ships and 1598 merchant ships. "This impressive record," Admiral King observed, "speaks for itself and helps to explain the sudden collapse of Japan's will to resist."

. . . While the damage to their cities and production centers by strategic bombing was fully as great as photographic reconnaissance had indicated, the strangulation from our less obvious, but relentlessly effective surface and submarine blockade and from our carrier-based air attacks had been a decisive factor in the enemy's collapse. Their Merchant Marine had been reduced to a fraction of its former size; of the few remaining ships, mostly small ones, only half were still operable. Their food situation was critical, and their remaining resources in fuel and all strategic materials were not less so. It had been known that their few remaining carriers and heavy Navy vessels had been damaged, but it appeared that the fury of our carrier strikes had forced them to withdraw all but a handful of men from these ships, practically abandoning them.

There were plans, well advanced, for landing our troops on the main Japanese islands in the autumn. Nevertheless, the Secretary of War also informed the President that if we were to effect a landing on one of the main islands and begin a forceful occupation of Japan, we should probably find that we had cast the die of last-ditch resistance. Fleet Admiral Nimitz was confident that neither invasion nor atomic bombing was required to produce surrender. He commented that our Pacific fleet was pounding Japan "with complete immunity." Japan was out of fuel. The battered remnant of her Navy had taken refuge of sorts in the Inland Sea. Secretary Stimson wrote that the attempt to exterminate Japan's armies and her population by gunfire "or other means" (the bomb was seldom mentioned in a memorandum except obliquely) would tend to produce a fusion of race solidarity and antipathy.⁹

At a far lower echelon, but as an indication of the state of opinion in the Navy Department on the end of the war, this is from a memorandum I addressed to the Secretary of the Navy on May 7, 1945:

Dear Jim:

. . . there is the possibility that V-J Day will follow V-E Day rather earlier than it is conservative to predict from the point of view of conducting the war. However, it would be conservative to plan on a rather prompt termination. You might find it useful therefore to ask the Bureaus now for a prompt report on steps to be taken with respect to

(a) contracts under negotiation, (b) work in progress, (c) personnel; —on the assumption that V-J Day will occur on, say, August 1 or at the latest by December 31 of this year.

The United States had, beside these individual judgments, one clear open window on Japan—our ability to intercept and rapidly decipher practically every communication between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Emperor's ambassadors overseas. We knew, accordingly, that the Japanese not only believed that they were beaten, they wanted to get out of the war as quickly as possible.

Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Chief of Naval Communications, brought to my office on July 13 an intercepted and decoded message from the Gaimusho (the Japanese Foreign Office) to Ambassador Sato in Moscow. It was signed by Togo, the Foreign Minister, and it instructed the Ambassador to call on Molotov at once before the Russians took off for Potsdam, where the Big Three, President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin were to meet. Sato was directed to lay before Molotov the earnest wish of the Emperor to see the end of the war. There were some pious expressions about the cessation of bloodshed, followed by a statement that Japan was prepared to forgo retention of territories she had conquered.

Later intercepts grew more desperate as Sato reported that he could not get to Molotov and had to content himself with interviews with a deputy, Lozovsky, who continually put him off with diplomatic double talk. On July 15, Sato's dispatch made it clear how well aware he was that Japan was utterly and completely defeated.

Forrestal, of course, saw the intercepts as they were received. We frequently read them together. He noted in his diary that Russian intervention to end the war was being sought even before there could have been much effect from the thousand-plane bombing raids of the Third Fleet and the naval bombardment of Kamaishi. As rapidly as they were received, Forrestal sent the intercepts to Admiral Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff, and later took the whole collection with him to Potsdam. He had not been invited to attend the Potsdam Conference, but he shared the view of former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, our wisest and most experienced Far Eastern diplomat, that if permitted to retain the Emperor the Japanese would agree to what, in every other respect, would be the "unconditional" surrender we sought.

Having decided that his responsibilities warranted him to "kibitz" (as he put it), Forrestal went to Potsdam without the grace of an invita-

tion. He did not fly there directly. Wishing his appearance to appear casual and in the course of other business, he stopped over in Paris on July 27, calling on Ambassador Jefferson Caffery and attending to certain Navy business and did not reach Potsdam until the twenty-eighth. An irreversible entropy of events had occurred before his plane touched down.

Immediately on arrival he took the file of intercepted messages to Secretary Byrnes, who then saw them "in detail" for the first time. The Secretary of State had only been sworn in on July 3. On July 6 he had left for Potsdam, and the intervening day of briefing was almost entirely devoted to the issues on the Potsdam agenda. These related to the Allied positions on the defeat of Germany. He had not previously seen the texts of the messages.¹⁰

One message carried by Forrestal had been intercepted as recently as July 25. It was an instruction from the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. He was to go to any place that Molotov might designate and while still maintaining "unconditional surrender" to be unacceptable, to state that Japan had "no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter" and that the terms requested by Japan were only those necessary to "secure and maintain our nation's existence and honor." The message mentioned the imminence of "complete collapse" and could only be read as having been prepared in an atmosphere of desperation.

Forrestal was too late by forty-eight hours. The Potsdam Declaration—the ultimatum to Japan—had been dispatched on the twenty-sixth, and events were now in the saddle, riding the decision makers.

On August 2, there was another intercept. "The battle situation has become acute," it understated. "There are only a few days left in which to make arrangements to end the war. . . . Since the loss of one day relative to this present matter may result in a thousand years of regret, it is requested that you immediately have a talk with Molotov."

About the only relief in this tense period is a curious picture of President Truman and Premier Stalin trading intelligence.

The problem had arisen as to what if anything should be disclosed to Stalin about the coming A-bomb attack. Churchill agreed that it would be appropriate that the President might offhandedly tell Stalin that the U.S. had perfected "an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite out of the ordinary." And Stalin for his part had some intelligence to impart to the President. He had evidently decided to treat it

"offhandedly" also. There had been some sort of a message from the Japanese Emperor, he indicated, which had been delivered by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. The message stated that, while unconditional surrender was unacceptable, the Japanese were ready to come to terms. Stalin played it down.

President Truman could not compromise his intelligence sources by saying he had known of the messages well before Stalin ever saw them, and Stalin, for his part, when the President spoke so calmly of the new bomb, gave to Mr. Churchill (who observed the colloquy from the other side of the room) the impression "that he had no idea of the significance of what he was being told." Stalin's espionage organization, as we now have reason to know, had been able to keep him informed. Secretary Byrnes thought that Stalin's lack of eagerness to know anything about the bomb was due to the fact that "The Russians kept secret their development in military weapons" and "thought it improper to ask about ours."¹¹ Unfortunately, there is no photograph of the two highest-level poker-faces at that moment in history.

On July 25 the President had made his decision. His orders had gone out to the Pacific, and on the little island of Tinian the special bomber group which long had trained to handle the bombs made its final preparations. Some months earlier a few officers especially cleared for the purpose had reviewed the maps of Japanese cities and selected a number of them as prospective targets. A committee of officers had been sent out to Los Alamos, where they conferred with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the director of the laboratory, and some of his associates. Dr. Oppenheimer was to testify nine years later that "Hiroshima was of course very successful partly for reasons unanticipated by us. We had been over the targets with a committee that was sent to consult us and to consider them, and the targets that were bombed were among the list that seemed bright to us."¹²

One individual had a negative voice in the choice of targets for the bomb. Among the cities initially selected for the bombing had been Kyoto. Secretary Stimson, when he learned of it, interposed his personal veto. I had visited Kyoto in 1926 and could appreciate his reasons. Kyoto was the cultural and religious center of old Japan. There were located the delicately beautiful palaces of the former emperors who held court in exile while the country was governed by the warlike shoguns in Tokyo. There were the hundreds of ancient temples and shrines fashioned of carved and gilded wood. Destruction of Kyoto would

have added vandalism to whatever charge might be leveled against the target selections.

About a recommendation which had been made that instead of exploding the bomb over an inhabited city it should be demonstrated over some unpopulated area, the laboratory group said that they "did not think exploding one of these things as a firecracker over a desert was likely to be very impressive."¹³

Einstein and Szilard sought unsuccessfully to arrest the course of events initiated by the famous letter of six years earlier. A second letter to President Roosevelt was written by Dr. Einstein and is reported to have been found unopened among the President's mail in Warm Springs, Georgia, at the time of his death in April 1945.¹⁴

The letter requested an appointment for Dr. Szilard to propose certain considerations and recommendations which "unusual circumstances" persuaded Einstein should be brought to the attention of the President in spite of the fact that he did not know the substance of the considerations and recommendations which Szilard proposed to submit. This was due to the fact that security prevented Szilard from any disclosures to Einstein. Einstein concluded with the statement that he understood Szilard was greatly concerned about the lack of adequate contact between the scientists who were working on the project and the members of the President's cabinet who were responsible for formulating policy.

When President Truman received the letter, he referred it to Secretary Byrnes with the request that the Secretary see Dr. Szilard, who, in company with Drs. Urey and Walter Bartky, called on him at his home in Spartanburg, South Carolina, on May 28. When they left, Secretary Byrnes gave them Dr. Einstein's letter, which Szilard duly returned to the President's secretary. Secretary Byrnes has recorded that, as Dr. Einstein's letter had forecast, Szilard "complained that he and some of his associates did not know enough about the policy of the Government with regard to the use of the bomb." Secretary Byrnes did not react favorably to the suggestion that discussion between the scientists and the policy-makers at Cabinet level should be initiated. In the course of his presentation, Byrnes recalled that Szilard had said that the younger scientists were very critical of Drs. Bush, Compton, and Conant, who were among the senior scientific advisers to the President. Byrnes told the delegation that Dr. Oppenheimer would be consulted about the use of the bomb, which assurance appeared to satisfy them.¹⁵

Under Secretary Ralph Bard represented the Navy Department on the Interdepartmental Committee on Atomic Energy (Army, Navy, State) and forthrightly committed his views to the record at the time:

27 June 1945

MEMORANDUM ON THE USE OF S-I BOMB

Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.

During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese Government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.

I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in this country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out.

/s/ Ralph A. Bard

Dr. Arthur H. Compton, the Nobel laureate in physics, who had contributed so outstandingly to the war effort, also raised the question of whether it might not be possible to arrange a demonstration of the bomb, "in such a manner that the Japanese will be so impressed that they would see the uselessness of continuing the war."¹⁶

I had made a suggestion to Secretary Forrestal that the power of the bomb be displayed as a warning in an uninhabited area. It seemed to me that a demonstration over a forest would offer impressive evidence to show the terrible effect of enormous blast and heat. A meteor which

fell near Lake Baikal in Siberia in 1908 had knocked down forests for miles around its point of impact and the trees lay in windrows radiating like the spokes of a wheel from the center. I recalled a grove of cryptomeria trees near the little village of Nikko on the main Japanese island. This seemed to me a place where an impressive demonstration could be made. The inhabitants, priests, and shrine servants could be warned to evacuate beforehand. It troubled me to think of using what might turn out to be a cataclysmic weapon over a crowded Japanese metropolis of wood-and-paper houses and multitudes of women and children in a defeated nation.

In justification for the rejection of these proposals it has since been argued that even the first test in New Mexico was not sufficient to assure that the weapon would explode when dropped from an airplane. This was because the system for detonating the bomb at a predetermined altitude had not been proved at Alamogordo, where the bomb was fixed on the top of a steel tower. This argument was furnished to Secretary Stimson, who restated it in a magazine article in 1947. The fusing system had been repeatedly and successfully tested, however. This specific justification against a demonstration seemed to me of little validity.

Secretary Forrestal recorded a conversation which he had with John J. McCloy in March of 1947. McCloy had recalled a meeting with President Truman in the summer of 1945, before Potsdam. McCloy had volunteered his views, which were that the Japanese should be told that we had perfected a terrifyingly destructive weapon which we would have to use if they did not surrender. He had said that some of the Japanese who had been in Germany during our bombing raids were now back in Japan and could testify to the devastation they had seen produced by conventional weapons. We should add, McCloy said, that the Japanese would be permitted to retain the Emperor and a form of government of their own choosing. Forrestal noted that McCloy observed that the military leaders were somewhat annoyed at his interference but that the President welcomed it. At the conclusion of McCloy's comments, the President had "ordered such a political offensive to be set in motion."¹⁷ The offensive greatly strengthened the hands of the peace party in Japan but was eclipsed.

General Eisenhower was in Potsdam at this period, but, the war in Europe being over, he had not been invited as a participant in the conference. Secretary Stimson told him, however, about the test at Alamogordo and described his relief that it had been successful. He indi-

cated his keen sense of personal responsibility. General Eisenhower expressed the hope that we would never have to use such a weapon against an enemy because he disliked seeing the United States "initiate the use" of anything so horrible and destructive.¹⁸

The voices recommending restraint were crying in the wilderness. First doubts and then opposition had developed in the weapon laboratories themselves. There had been round robins and petitions. One of the latter, the so-called Franck report, was prepared at the University of Chicago and addressed to the Secretary of War on June 11, 1945. It bore a distinguished group of names besides that of James Franck, a Nobel prize winner, the first to sign it—among them Leo Szilard, Glenn T. Seaborg, D. Hughes, T. Hogness, E. Rabinowitch, and C. J. Nickson. I have seen no indication that it reached the President and am inclined to think that it did not. The document made the point that a demonstration of the new weapon might be made before the eyes of representatives of all United Nations on a desert or a barren island.

A petition to the President had been prepared in the Metallurgical Laboratory (the Atomic Weapons Project) at the University of Chicago and signed by a large number of scientists. It read in part:

Until recently we have had to fear that the United States might be attacked by atomic bombs during this war and that her only defense might lie in a counterattack by the same means. Today, with the defeat of Germany, this danger is averted and we feel impelled to say what follows:

The war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion and attacks by atomic bombs may very well be an effective method of warfare. We feel, however, that such attacks on Japan could not be justified, at least not unless the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan were made public in detail and Japan were given an opportunity to surrender.

The text of the petition apparently reached the White House as a copy provided by Szilard to Presidential Secretary Connolly eleven days after Hiroshima.

The Hyde Park Agreement of September 19, 1944, which is later described and which for many years was thought to exist only in the original possessed by Sir Winston Churchill, until another signed original was found ten years later at Hyde Park, states a conclusion reached between the President and the Prime Minister at that time: ". . . when a bomb is finally available, it *might perhaps, after mature consideration,* be used against the Japanese. . . ." (Italics supplied.)

Mr. Churchill recalls that at Potsdam, however, "there never was a moment's discussion as to whether the atomic bomb should be used or not," adding, "The historic fact remains, and must be judged in the aftertime, that the *decision whether or not to use the atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never an issue. . . .* There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do otherwise." (Italics supplied.)¹⁹

A declaration, in effect an ultimatum, was issued over the names of President Truman, Clement Attlee, and Chiang Kai-shek on July 26. Stalin was not a signatory, since Russia had not yet declared war on Japan and was not to do so for another thirteen days. Indeed the Japanese and the Russians had a mutual nonaggression pact which was to be violated by Soviet aggression. An article of the Charter of the United Nations could be conveniently construed that, if a conflict should develop between the previous understandings of a member nation and its obligations under the U.N. Charter, the latter would prevail. Churchill was not a signatory as the tally of votes in the British elections had unhorsed him on that very day. Though he had expected victory and was surprised by the Labor-party landslide, he had brought Attlee to Potsdam with true statesmanship in order that continuity would be provided in the remote possibility of defeat.

The declaration contained no warning that anything as radically different from conventional weapons as the atomic bomb would be used against Japan if she resisted surrender. Four days before the President had left for Potsdam, Secretary Stimson brought him a memorandum which had been prepared in collaboration with Forrestal, McCloy, and Grew. It urged the issuance of a warning proclamation which would make it clear that the maintenance of a constitutional monarchy under the ruling dynasty was not excluded. It is also clear from Stimson's covering letter that inclusion of a specific warning about the new weapon was implicit. He called the President's attention to the fact that the draft proclamation made no specific mention of the employment of any new weapon and that it would "have to be revamped to conform to the efficacy of such a weapon if the warning were to be delivered, as would almost certainly be the case, in conjunction with its use."²⁰ But the declaration contained no mention of willingness to concede the continuation of a constitutional monarchy. (We volunteered this concession, of course, after surrender in order to facilitate the procedures of occupation.) How that essential and apparently settled feature disappeared

by the
public

from the drafting is not entirely clear, though there were those who opposed it, including former Secretary of State Hull, who believed that it would be regarded as a form of appeasement. In a pre-Potsdam conversation with Forrestal, Grew had expressed his satisfaction with the draft of the proposed message to the Japanese which had been finally "whipped into shape." Although its aim was to make the phrase "unconditional surrender" more specific, Grew said he was afraid that it would be "ditched on the way over" to Potsdam by people who were accompanying the President and "who reflect the view that we cannot hold out any clarification of terms to Japan which could be construed as a desire to get the Japanese war over with before Russia has an opportunity to enter."²¹

In the Stimson memoir a point is made of the possibility, in the light of the final surrender, "that a clearer and earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Emperor would have produced an earlier ending of the war," though both President Truman and his military advisers had to weigh the alternative possibility that it might have been construed by the Japanese as an indication of weakness. This is difficult to reconcile with a nation suing for peace and our knowledge of the state of Japanese morale.* The decision to omit this one point from the Potsdam Declaration had consequences from which the world will be long in recovering. It was indeed the ultimate decision which precipitated the use of the bomb.

Ambassador Grew later wrote that the surrender of the Japanese could have been obtained had the President issued a categorical statement that surrender would not mean the elimination of the Japanese imperial dynasty. Such a statement, Grew felt, would have afforded the "surrender-minded elements in the government . . . a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clear-cut decision."

Flashed across the Pacific, the ultimatum reached the hands of the divided and panicky body of men who in various official capacities surrounded Emperor Hirohito. It was closely examined for some indication of protection for his person. Finding none, they let it be known on July 28 that the declaration would be "received in silence." This indecisive expression, an effort at temporizing, was interpreted or paraphrased to the Allies in Potsdam even more negatively as "rejected." The fatal word was "mokusatsu." This has been variously rendered as

* The term "suing for peace" may be questioned, but the intercepted messages exchanged between Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo and Ambassador Sato in Moscow in July 1945 are scarcely open to any other interpretation.

Also - not the judgment of Japanese experts in State.

Esp: not after Okinawa ended; and if combined with a warning of Sov entry, or with Sov entry -

meaning "to disregard it," "to take no notice of it," "to treat it with silent contempt," "to ignore it." Never perhaps in history has so much depended upon the decision to select from alternative translations one destined to stand forever under the blight of disaster. The men in Potsdam fully understood that it was not in any sense a formal reply.²²

On the same day Stalin appears to have informed President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee of the Japanese proposal to send a mission headed by Prince Konoye to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. While we knew by way of intercepts of this Japanese attempt to approach us by way of the Russians and that it had been delayed by Moscow with apparent deliberation, nothing appears to have been done thereafter to encourage any other contact, direct or otherwise, with the Japanese.

Meanwhile, fate, moving on the tiny island of Tinian, gathered momentum.*

Although the orders to General Spaatz in the Pacific had been dispatched before the July 26 ultimatum, the President had an understanding with his Secretary of War which included the possibility of a countermand if the Japanese reply proved to be acceptable.²³ There was no countermand. Accordingly, at two forty-five in the morning of August 6, weather conditions being favorable, the bomber *Enola Gay* was air-borne. Soon afterward, Captain W. S. Parsons inserted the fissionable charge into the lethal cargo. He performed the feat of arming the bomb barehanded (for a more secure "feel" of the parts), in freezing temperatures, in the bomb bay of the aircraft. This was done in the air to protect the personnel on the base at Tinian if the plane had failed on take-off.²⁴ Six and a half hours later the bomb was released over Hiroshima, set to explode as soon as the plane had reached a safe distance. Seconds later the city and most of its inhabitants ceased to exist. Three days later Nagasaki, another of the targets that had "seemed bright to us," became literally bright in the more-than-sun-like brilliance of the second bomb's explosion. Neither had been "a firecracker exploded over a desert": 152,000 people were dead.

Only three days elapsed between the first bomb and the second, but our ally, Stalin, was quick to act. The Soviet declaration of war was

* Eloquently expressed by Dr. Herbert Feis in his *Japan Subdued*. "Two measures, long in preparation, were about to be taken: dropping the atomic bomb and the entry into the war of a great new antagonist, the Soviet Union. By this time in fact the impetus of both was so great, and the plans for their execution were so complete, that only a most resolute and courageous act of will—of a kind rarely recorded in history—could have stayed them." IF JAPANESE DID NOT SURRENDER FIRST BUT OFFER TO EMP. COULD HAVE FORESTALLED THEM AND WARNINGS

promptly handed to Sato by Molotov on the afternoon of the eighth of August. It was so phrased as to convey the impression that it was mandatory upon the Soviet Government under the Charter of the United Nations. This was, of course, a convenient sophistry. By the following day, August 9, Soviet tank divisions were rolling into Manchuria, and on the next day Japan sued for peace—formally. In the general rejoicing over that event and its association in time with the atomic bombings, the weight of Russia's action on the Japanese decision has been largely overlooked. Expert opinions differed.

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General Arnold, the Army Air Force Chief of Staff, believed that it was air bombardment by conventional means which had brought Japan to her knees.²⁵ Major General Claire L. Chennault, who had commanded our air forces in China, was convinced that it was the entrance of Russia into the war which produced the collapse of Japan. In an interview in the *New York Times* on August 15, he was quoted as stating that Japan would have surrendered whether or not atomic bombs had been dropped. A few years later the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, with all the facts before it, was to confirm that Japan was ready to surrender in 1945 without the atomic bomb and without an American invasion. *on Sov!*

The survey found that "It is apparent that the effect of the atomic bombings on the confidence of the Japanese civilian population was remarkably localized. Outside of the target cities, it was subordinate to other demoralizing experiences."

*now long
Bomb*

The report also said that the atomic bomb alone had not convinced the Japanese leaders of the necessity of surrender. The decision to seek ways and means to end the war, influenced in part by the low state of popular morale had already been taken in May of 1945 by what was known as the Supreme War Guidance Council. Prior to July 1, doubts about a Japanese victory were shared by 74 per cent of the population, and some 47 per cent had become certain that a Japanese victory was impossible. With regard to the bombing, the Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that the reaction of the Japanese population at some distance from the target cities was blunted by their direct experience with other misfortunes and hardships, and that in Japan as a whole military losses and failures, such as those at Saipan, the Philippines, and Okinawa, "were twice as important as the atomic bomb in inducing certainty of defeat. Other raids over Japan as a whole were more than three times as important in this respect. Consumer deprivations, such as food shortages and the attendant malnutrition, were also

more important in bringing people to the point where they felt that they could not go on with the war."

The war was over. Our inscrutable Eastern ally, with his concealed plans looking far ahead into the future and to world conquest, had come in, in time for the kill. The Russians knew from the desperate approaches made by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow that the Japanese craved to end the war. They had known this from the last days in May, yet they had told us nothing of it until Stalin's offhand reference in Potsdam.

President Truman did not shirk responsibility for the decision. As he put it in his memoirs:

The final decision of when and where to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used: The top military advisers to the President recommended its use, and *when I talked to Churchill* he unhesitatingly told me that he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to end the war. (Italics supplied.)

But it was not that unilateral. All of us, the President's fellow countrymen, shared in varying degrees in that responsibility. His principal adviser, Secretary Stimson, was a man who had been a lifelong champion of international law. He had repeatedly argued that war itself must be restrained within the bounds of humanity, and as recently as sixty days before the atomic bombings had asked General Arnold whether the apparently indiscriminate fire-bombings of Tokyo were absolutely necessary.²⁶ Yet he had made a decision he later described as "stern and heart-rending," in the advice he gave to the President. Other advisers must have been similarly torn. Against Mr. Churchill's recollection that there was never a moment's discussion as to whether the bomb should be used or not, the President recalls "unhesitating" agreement from him. Both men and their counselors appear trapped in the path of the avalanche of events.

By now

Historians would do well to disregard an observation recorded by one of the President's close advisers "that the scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had been spent on this project." No such sentiment was ever expressed by any of the many scientists with whom I have discussed the subject at length and over the years.

General Eisenhower, reflecting on the holocausts of August 6 and 9, wrote while yet in Germany that "with the evidence of the most de-

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structive war yet waged by the peoples of the earth about me, I gained increased hope that this development of what appeared to be the ultimate in destruction would drive men, in self-preservation, to find a way of eliminating war . . . that fear, universal fear, might possibly succeed where statesmanship and religion had not yet won success."²⁷

The decision to use the atomic bomb to accelerate the end of a war already won was not the same as the one five years earlier when a decision had been taken to make the bomb. Yet both were decisions by compassionate men within the finite limits of human judgment. Both were decisions made by our chosen representatives. All of us in some degree shared an inescapable responsibility which will be judged, as Churchill has said, "in the after-time."

* Now — last (?) chance — from of profif
right drive this? (to end war:
"Soviet with nws")
or just, to end profif
(impossible — before terrorist forces.
and soon more

a end use
But not (either?) without nws' use
by NWS
2) prospect of info. possession
NWS?
3) or, possession? (nations?)

X

The Decision to Detect

Make strong the watch—establish watchmen—prepare . .

JEREMIAH 51:1

But if the watchman see the sword come, and blow not the trumpet, and the people be not warned . . .

EZEKIEL 33:

In 1946 the Soviet delegate to the United Nations let it be known that in peace-loving Communist Russia the facts about atomic energy were "very well understood." But atomic energy was being employed by his country for peaceful purposes only—to change the courses of rivers and to remove mountains. This was welcome news to a world, bone-weary after six years of the most devastating war in history.

To a surprising degree the world has maintained its wide-eyed and childlike credulity about Soviet pronouncements. It is a state of mind that, astonishingly, survives periods of disillusionment when the actions of the Soviets expose their insincerity and untruthfulness. The phenomenon is unexplained. Not everyone, however, accepted Soviet assurances in 1946 that the development of atomic energy in Russia was solely pacific and humanitarian. The first Atomic Energy Commissioners did not.

The several Commissioners were confirmed by the Senate in April 1947. At a meeting shortly thereafter we discussed a memorandum I had addressed to my colleagues. The memorandum noted that we had no information as to whether the intelligence arrangements of the Manhattan Engineer District had made provision in the past for continuous monitoring of radioactivity in the atmosphere. "This," it said, "would be perhaps the best means we would have for discovering that a test of an atomic weapon had been made by any other nation. It is to be presumed that any other country going into a large-scale manufacture of

I would like to conclude by repeating my sense of deep appreciation that you should have considered me worthy of this preferment.

Sincerely yours,
/ s / Lewis L. Strauss

Honorable Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy

4. Letter from Vice-Admiral H. G. Bowen to Burt Nanus, dated 8 April 1959. "Admiral Strauss, then a Commander in the Naval Reserve, arrived in Washington when I was Director of the Naval Research Laboratory. . . . He did more to establish the Office of Naval Research than anyone else."

5. Associated with him, besides De Florez, were a group of unusually able men, among whom were Captain Robert D. Conrad, Dr. Alan T. Waterman, and Dr. Emanuel Piore.

6. Vice-Admiral Louis Denfeld, USN, Chief of Personnel, in a memorandum dated December 28, 1945, wrote: "The Naval Technical Mission to Europe was Rear Admiral Strauss' conception. He promoted it and selected the officers who successfully headed it."

CHAPTER IX. "A THOUSAND YEARS OF REGRET"

1. ". . . most of us [the scientists] are certain that the Japanese cannot develop and use this weapon effectively." From "A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes . . ." by Henry D. Smyth, July 1, 1945, 13-3.

2. *Physical Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 7, October 1, 1939.

3.

1 June 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Subject: Submarine Submerged Propulsion—Uranium Power Source—
Status of as of this date.

1. Under certain special circumstances of bombardment by neutrons, the heavy element uranium dissociates into two other elements with the evolution of tremendous amounts of energy which may be converted directly into heat and used in a flash boiler steam plant. Such a source of energy does not depend on the oxidation of organic material and therefore does not require that oxygen be carried down in the submarine if uranium is used as a power source. This is a tremendous military advantage and would enormously increase the range and military effectiveness of a submarine.

2. . . . The next point of importance has been to learn if this reaction can be made to proceed more or less spontaneously. . . .

3. The Carnegie Institution was approached in regard to carrying on tests on this problem. The institution refused to accept a contract to give us this information but did release funds to the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism which permitted them to carry on the required experiments. Dr. Merle Tuve of the Carnegie Institution has been most helpful in keeping this Laboratory informed of all the developments in this field.

4. It has been established that uranium alone will not dissociate spontane-

ously, but the concensus of opinion at this time is that the isotope of uranium 235 is likely to dissociate in a manner which will be most useful in Naval problems. . . . The next step in an understanding of this problem is to secure an adequate supply of the uranium isotope so that final tests may be conducted.

5. The separation of the isotope 235 is best accomplished by a centrifugal method worked on and developed by Dr. J. W. Beams of the University of Virginia. . . .

6. If it is possible for Dr. Beams to separate the isotope to the necessary extent, Dr. Tuve of the Carnegie Institution has agreed to carry on the final tests at his laboratory. . . .

. . . . If the method will work, it is of outstanding importance. . . . If it will not work, it is of the utmost importance to determine this fact at the earliest practicable date. In view of the willing cooperation of the many scientists in this country to carry on these investigations at practically no cost to the Laboratory, it is recommended that a small appropriation be made available to buy an adequate supply of uranium to carry on these preliminary tests to their logical conclusion.

Ross Gunn
Technical Adviser

4. Smyth Report, 1945.
5. Truman, Harry S., *Year of Decisions*, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955.
6. Byrnes, James F., *Speaking Frankly*, Harper & Brothers, 1947, page 258.
7. Stimson, Henry L., and Bundy, McGeorge, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, Harper & Brothers, 1949, page 635.
8. Mr. Bundy served with Robert A. Taft in the legal division of Mr. Hoover's Food Administration in 1917-18. He was one of Secretary Stimson's principal assistants and accompanied him to Potsdam. See "Remembered Words," by Harvey H. Bundy, *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1957.
9. Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, page 622.
10. Byrnes, James F., *All in One Lifetime*, Harper & Brothers, 1958, page 297.

Forrestal, James V., *Diaries*, Viking Press, 1951, page 78.

Secretary Byrnes in a letter to the writer states, "It is understandable that at that time I did not know all the details, because I had only become Secretary on July 3, 1945. The following day was a holiday and we left Washington the evening of the 6th. I was in the Department only two working days, July 5th and 6th. We anticipated little discussion at Potsdam about the Japanese phase of the war and in those two days we concentrated on the subjects incident to winding up the European conflict, which were on the agenda."

According to Herbert Feis . . . "the State Department historians who collected and edited the Potsdam papers have not found it possible to establish precisely which of the messages (in translation) were read by Stimson and other members of the American civilian and military groups while they were in Potsdam, nor precisely when they were informed of the contents of

particular messages." Feis, Herbert, *Japan Subdued*, Princeton University Press, 1961, page 57, footnote.

11. Byrnes, James F., *Speaking Frankly*, page 263.

12. In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Texts of Principal Documents and Letters of the Personnel Security Board, General Manager, and Commissioners, Washington, D.C., May 27, 1954, through June 29, 1954, page 33, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1954.

13. *Ibid.*, page 34.

14. Letter from Albert Einstein to President Roosevelt, dated March 25, 1945.

112 Mercer Street
Princeton, New Jersey
March 25, 1945

*Booking of Tokyo
March 2-10*

The Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I am writing you to introduce Dr. L. Szilard who proposes to submit to you certain considerations and recommendations. Unusual circumstances which I shall describe further below induce me to take this action in spite of the fact that I do not know the substance of the considerations and recommendations which Dr. Szilard proposes to submit to you.

In the summer of 1939 Dr. Szilard put before me his views concerning the potential importance of uranium for national defense. He was greatly disturbed by the potentialities involved and anxious that the United States Government be advised of them as soon as possible. Dr. Szilard, who is one of the discoverers of the neutron emission of uranium on which all present work on uranium is based, described to me a specific system which he devised and which he thought would make it possible to set up a chain reaction in unseparated uranium in the immediate future. Having known him for over twenty years both from his scientific work and personally, I have much confidence in his judgment and it was on the basis of his judgment as well as my own that I took the liberty to approach you in connection with this subject. You responded to my letter dated August 2, 1939 by the appointment of a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Briggs and thus started the Government's activity in this field.

The terms of secrecy under which Dr. Szilard is working at present do not permit him to give me information about his work; however, I understand that he now is greatly concerned about the lack of adequate contact between scientists who are doing this work and those members of your Cabinet who are responsible for formulating policy. In the circumstances I consider it my duty to give Dr. Szilard this introduction and I wish to express the hope that you will be able to give his presentation of the case your personal attention.

Very truly yours,
A. Einstein

15. Byrnes, James F., *All in One Lifetime*, page 284.

16. Compton, Arthur H., *Atomic Quest; a Personal Narrative*, Oxford University Press, 1956, pages 238-39.

- 17. Forrestal, *op. cit.*, page 71.
- 18. Eisenhower, Dwight D., *Crusade in Europe*, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948, page 443.
- 19. Churchill, Sir Winston, *Triumph and Tragedy*, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1953, page 639.
- 20. Potsdam Papers, Document 592.
- 21. Forrestal, *op. cit.*, page 73.
- 22. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, page 421.
- 23. Truman, *loc. cit.*
- 24. No man in the entire project was more widely respected for his intelligence or more admired for personal qualities. He died suddenly, in mid-career, on December 5, 1953. I was at an allied "summit" conference in Bermuda when the news of his death, arrived. President Eisenhower and the Prime Minister were discussing the President's speech on Atoms for Peace, on which Admiral Parsons had collaborated only a few days earlier.
- 25. Arnold, Henry H., *Global Mission*, Harper & Brothers, 1949, page 598.
- 26. Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, page 632.
- 27. Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, page 456.

CHAPTER X. THE DECISION TO DETECT

1. Truman, Harry S., *Years of Trial and Hope*, Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1956, page 306.

The closest estimate was made by Dr. Vannevar Bush. Secretary Forrestal, who talked with Bush at the Cabinet meeting on September 21, 1945, quoted him to the author as believing that, if the Russians concentrated their scientific and industrial resources upon that one objective, they might equal our 1945 position by 1950. The first Russian test was announced from the White House four years later to the month.

2. The Joint Committee in a report to Congress on October 13, 1949, referred to "Russia's ownership of the bomb, years ahead of the anticipated date. . . ."
3. From a report to the writer.
4. Truman, page 306.
5. *Op. cit.*, page 307.
6. Letter from General W. M. Canterbury to the writer.

CHAPTER XI. DECISION ON THE HYDROGEN BOMB

1. "Results at Bikini" by Ernest K. Lindley, 22 July 1946.
2. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, October 13, 1949, page 81.
3. *Ibid.*, page 47.
4. His letter appears in full in the transcript of the Oppenheimer Hearing: In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Texts of Principal Documents and letters of the Personnel Security Board, General Manager, and Com-

missioners, Washington, D.C., May 27, 1954, through June 29, 1954, page 238, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1954.
 5. Truman, Harry S., *Years of Trial and Hope*, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956, page 309.

6.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
 Washington 25, D.C.

9 November 1949

Dear Mr. President:

Just before leaving I feel that I should set down for your consideration certain thoughts with reference to the super atom bomb proposal. These thoughts are my reactions to the situation which led to a recent report by the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission and are the ideas which I expressed at an executive session of the Armed Forces Policy Council on yesterday.

I am taking the liberty of leaving this letter with Under Secretary Early in order that you may not be bothered with it unless the situation develops to a point requiring some decision on your part.

If renunciation of this objective by the United States could ensure its abandonment or failure everywhere else in the world, I could agree with the recommendation of the GAC.

In the absence of a strong international agreement, backed by adequate inspection, it is clear that Russia could proceed with the development of this type of weapon quite irrespective of any high-minded decisions and announcements on our part. There is no basic scientific secret standing in the way and there are some brilliant atomic scientists among the Russians and collaborating Germans.

While I should hope that we can keep well ahead of Russia, I think we are more likely to underestimate than to overestimate their capacity. Certainly we will not keep ahead of them in this particular project if we renounce it and they work on it.

Therefore, until an adequate international solution is worked out, it seems to me that our own national security and the protection of the type of civilization which we value, require us to proceed with the development of the most powerful atomic weapons which may be in sight. We can "hope to God they won't work", but so long as there is a reasonable possibility that they may work, it seems to me essential that we proceed with research and development on such projects as long as possible enemies may be doing the same thing.

For whatever it is worth, therefore, my judgment is that we should proceed with this phase of atomic weapon development, with increased activity and support, but that we should do so without fanfare or publicity.

Respectfully yours,
 /s/ Karl T. Compton
 Karl T. Compton
 Chairman

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C.

7. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1950, page 75.
 8. Diocesan Letter of the Archbishop of York for May 1955.

CHAPTER XII. VIGNETTES OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCHERS

1. Memorandum to L. L. Strauss.

Sept. 1955

This is a restatement of the remarks that I made during our conversation today, regarding the probable consequence of a UN sponsored study of world-wide radiation effects.

I think that such a study is, in the long run, neither undesirable nor avoidable *per se*, but that it contains considerable elements of danger, unless certain points that we must insist on, are understood *a priori*. If these points are not appreciated, the study would be worse than nothing—even worse than a good deal of international unpopularity.

The points that I have in mind are the following ones.

The present vague fear and vague talk regarding the adverse world-wide effects of general radioactive contamination are all geared to the concept that any general damage to life must be excluded, and at least with certainty. However, it is quite certain, that no realistic and operable approach to these problems will be found, until and unless it is realised that this approach is absurd. No industry, no human effort, no progress has ever been achieved on such terms. Every worthwhile activity has a price, both in terms of certain damage and of potential damage—of risks—and the only relevant question is, whether the price is worth paying.

No progress in medicine was ever achieved without incurring physiological and biological risks, sometimes of even only very vaguely foreseeable orders of magnitude. The history of the introduction of X-rays is an eloquent example of this, and no one can tell whether our present practices with antibiotics and hormones may not repeat some phases of that experience.

The chemical industry has affected local climate in some important cases in unforeseen—and sometimes still unexplained—ways. Every industry, every new means of transportation improves its quota in casualties and fatalities.

It is characteristic, that we willingly pay at the rate of 30,000–40,000 additional fatalities per year—about 2% of our total death-rate!—for the advantages of individual transportation by automobile.

It is also characteristic that the safety standards of the nuclear industry are a good deal higher than those of the established industries. Two examples: All our Pacific tests had casualties—all, except the Castle fallouts, were due to non-nuclear activities, like automobile accidents, accidents involving the operation of ships, etc. The Castle fallout had one fatality and endangered to varying degrees about two hundred people—within a few weeks of it the capsizing of ferry in northern Japan, in the course of its normal operation, killed about [sic] thousand people, including twenty Americans—yet the Castle fallout was what attracted worldwide attention.

The really relevant point is: Is the price worth paying? For the U.S. it is. For an other country, with no nuclear industry and a neutralistic attitude in world politics it may not be. In a UN discussion we must not concede ahead of time, that we may not concur with other countries' evaluations in this regard. The evaluation itself may involve questions of national interest, and ours may differ from that of other countries.

This is particularly true, since the majority of the UN countries is in fact not productive in the atomic energy industry and any proposal to minimize, to eliminate danger, risks, etc. will be *per se* popular.

A certain amount of international unpopularity is therefore unavoidable for

us, and we will have to accept it is part-payment for our more advanced industrial position.

2. It is an interesting coincidence that the young lady who typed the first official document on the possibilities of nuclear propulsion was Virginia H. Walker, who has been my loyal assistant for fifteen years and has typed this manuscript.

CHAPTER XIII. DECISION ON SECURITY

1. *Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1960.

2. By ALNAV 27.

3. The Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs S. Lozovski invited the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires to his office in Moscow on February 20, 1946, and read to him a response from the Soviet Government to a statement made by the Canadian Prime Minister on the fifteenth of the same month. The Soviet statement admitted that the Soviet Military Attaché in Ottawa had received information of a secret character from Canadian nationals but disparaged its importance because, he said, "this information referred to technical data of which the Soviet organization had no need in view of more advanced technical attainments in the USSR; the information could be found in published works . . . and also in the well known brochure of the American Smyth. . . ."

Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946, pages 627-28.

4. In a letter to the author.

5. Stimson, Henry L., and Bundy, McGeorge, *On Active Service*, Harper & Brothers, 1949.

6. Eightieth Congress, First Session. Hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. January 28, 1947, page 32.

MR. LILIENTHAL: But there has been a relaxation, which is inevitable in peacetime perhaps, and there have been some serious *authorized* breaches of security—the authorized publication of information—which raises the question in many people's minds: If that information may be spoken about, why may I not discuss such and such a subject?

SENATOR MCMAHON: Mr. Lilienthal, I suppose the Smyth Report is the biggest giving out of information that we have had in the whole history of the project, is it not?

MR. LILIENTHAL: Yes, the Smyth Report is the principal breach of security since the beginning of the Atomic Energy Project, and it may well have been necessary, although many parts of it seemed to me very questionable indeed. But in any case, that has made our present chore a very, very difficult one. I call your attention, for example, to the fact that in that report four different ways of separating were generally described, and then the statement was made that all of them had succeeded.

Now, things like that just make our chore a really heart-rending one.

SENATOR MCMAHON: It has been estimated that that has brought other countries from one and a half to two years closer to the achievement of our own knowledge of atomic secrets. Have you any estimate of that?

MR. LILIENTHAL: No, I have not, Senator. It is hard for me to be temperate in

my feeling as to how difficult some of those things have made the present situation.

SENATOR MCMAHON: Who authorized the release of that Smyth Report?

MR. LILIENTHAL: I know it was recommended for release by the Committee; and authorized by General Groves; and authorized by the President, I have no doubt, I still say that this disclosure of information in some respects makes our chore of shoring up this security system a terribly hard one.

7. Kramish, Arnold, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union*, Stanford University Press, 1959.

8. Truman, Harry S., *Year of Decisions*, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955, pages 525-34.

9. *Ibid.*, page 423.

10. Reference "Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, Eighty-sixth Congress, First Session," May 13, 1959, pages 854-55.

11. From the testimony of John A. Waters, Director, Division of Security, AEC, Hearings before Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, on Joint Resolution 21, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session, 1955.

12. *Ibid.*

13. The *New York Times*, September 1, 1943; *ibid.*, March 12, 1948.

CHAPTER XIV. DECISION IN THE CASE OF DR. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

1. In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Texts of Principal Documents and Letters of the Personnel Security Board, General Manager, and Commissioners, Washington, D.C., April 12, 1954, through May 6, 1954, pages 837-38, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1954.

2. White House news conference, June 30, 1954.

3. White House news release, October 23, 1953.

4. Smyth Report, III. 2.

5. His letter appears in the transcript of the Oppenheimer Hearing, page 238.

6. Subject: Meeting with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer on 21 December 1953 in the office of the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

Representing the Commission: Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, and Kenneth D. Nichols, General Manager (the writer).

After exchanging amenities, discussing the sudden death of Admiral Parsons, etc., Mr. Strauss told Dr. Oppenheimer of the visit he had had this morning with Mr. Herbert Marks. (Refer to LLS' memorandum of conversation with Mr. Marks.) Dr. Oppenheimer indicated surprise and said that he had not heard of the subject. Mr. Strauss said that he had told Mr. Marks that he expected a visit from Dr. Oppenheimer this afternoon and that he would suggest that Dr. Oppenheimer give Mr. Marks a ring.

Mr. Strauss then told Dr. Oppenheimer that we were faced with a very difficult problem pertaining to his continued clearance. Mr. Strauss informed